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Bolivia’s Nationalised Natural Gas: 
Social and Economic Stability 
Under Morales
On May 1, 2006, newly elected president Evo Morales announced to the Bolivian people that “el gas es nuestro” – the gas is ours. In a move that seemingly 
countered the free-market shift that much of Latin America 
took over the past twenty-five years, Morales pledged to 
nationalise Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector. But the form of the 
nationalisation and its implications for transnational investors 
were radically different from the nationalisations that swept 
the region and the global oil and natural gas sector during the 
twentieth century. Embedded within a globalised neoliberal 
economy, dependent upon regional trading partners, and 
beholden to the demands of the Bolivia’s social movements, 
Morales put forward a “nationalisation without expropriation.” 
Understanding the opportunities and constraints that surrounded 
Bolivia’s natural gas, the Morales government created a more socially stable investment 
environment that has been beneficial for greater segments of the Bolivian population and 
potentially for transnational investors. 
BOLIvIA’s EnErgy sEctOr: An OvErvIEw
Bolivia sits atop the second largest supply of natural gas in south America. while the country’s 
proven natural reserves pale in comparison to venezuela’s, a favourable investment environment 
during the 1990s, limited internal demand, and a strategic geographic position in relation to 
Brazil and the southern cone make it the continent’s largest exporter of natural gas. Over the 
past ten years, natural gas production in Bolivia has increased from 2.8 billion cubic meters 
(bm3) in 1998 to 13.9 bm3 in 2008. Brazil is by far the largest consumer of Bolivia’s natural gas, 
importing 10.9 bm3 in 2008, to satisfy close to half of Brazil’s natural gas demand. Bolivia also 
exports smaller quantities of natural gas to Argentina. In 1999, a contract between the two 
countries expired and Argentina deemed that its own internal natural gas supplies were enough 
to satisfy its demands. However, in 2006 the two countries signed an agreement to increase 
the flow of Bolivia’s natural gas to Argentina, potentially to levels similar to that sent to Brazil.
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Bolivia’s petroleum reserves are less plentiful than its natural gas 
and the majority of petroleum production goes towards internal use. In 
2008, Bolivia produced around 41 thousand barrels of oil per day (MBD) 
and consumed around 36 MBD. Bolivia has two major refineries, both 
ofwhich operate at near capacity to satisfy internal demand. However, 
Bolivia faces diesel shortages almost yearly. the country’s crude oil is 
“superlight” and not easily refined into heavier hydrocarbons. As a 
result, Bolivia is forced to import diesel. In recent years, these imports 
have largely come from venezuela.
Other energy sources in Bolivia include hydropower, wood and other 
forms of combustible biomass. currently, hydropower is limited but 
recent agreements between Bolivia and Brazil to dam segments of the 
Amazon could increase hydropower in Bolivia from 477 megawatts 
(Mw) to 4200 Mw. In rural areas, a number of Bolivians still depend on 
more traditional biomass-based fuels for heat and cooking.
A BrIEf sOcIAL HIstOry: 1920 tO 2006
for much of the past century, Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector has been a 
site of international interest and contestation. standard Oil first entered 
Bolivia in the 1920s. However, linked to conflicts surrounding the origins 
of the chaco war, the state nationalised standard Oil’s assets in 1937 
and gave them to Bolivia’s nascent state owned hydrocarbon company 
yacimientos Petroliferos fiscales Bolivianos (yPfB). In the 1950s, Bolivia 
again opened its hydrocarbon sector to foreign investment as the 
United states conditioned its aid on the implementation of a petroleum 
code that guaranteed foreign investors access to the country’s oil 
reserves. while a number of foreign investors, including Brazil’s state 
owned oil and natural gas firm Petrobras, sought to operate in Bolivia 
under the new code, the state granted concessions only to gulf Oil. 
But as with previous foreign investment in the sector, gulf Oil’s assets 
became the target of nationalistic sentiment and in 1969 the state 
turned gulf’s concessions over to yPfB. After the nationalisation of 
gulf’s assets, foreign investors did not enter into Bolivia’s upstream 
hydrocarbon sector until 1978, when Occidental and tesoro signed 
minor operation contracts with the Bolivian state to extract oil and 
natural gas in select reserves.
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In the late 1970s, Bolivia began to feel the exogenous effects of the international economic 
crisis. After several changes in state power, Bolivia’s export-oriented elite rose to power in 1985 
and slowly began to dismantle the country’s state-owned enterprises. while the state primarily 
sought to end its role in the mining sector and open it up to private investment, its policy shifts 
undermined the profit-making capacities of yPfB and made Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector a ripe 
target for future privatisation. seeking to increase state revenues and regain the approval of 
international lending agencies, the state ended its petroleum subsidies and redirected all of 
yPfB’s earnings into central state coffers. In addition, that state prohibited all investment in 
new capital goods in the hydrocarbon sector. whereas yPfB previously managed a significant 
portion of its revenues and made investments in extraction and transport infrastructure when 
necessary, the policy changes of the 1980s defunded yPfB and made it into an unsustainable 
renter arm of the state.
In the late 1980s, Brazil’s increasing interest in Bolivia’s natural gas attracted the attention 
of foreign investors. while the two countries negotiated an agreement in which yPfB and 
Petrobras would be the primary companies involved in the extraction, transport, and sale of the 
natural gas, the Bolivian state diminished the role of yPfB in the deal as it sought to partially 
privatise its five largest public enterprises with the introduction of the Law of capitalisation 
in 1994. Over the following two years, the state divided yPfB into three parts and auctioned 
off 50 percent of each to the highest bidder. the remaining shares were reallocated to the 
state pension system and former employees of state operated enterprises. In an attempt to 
modernise and bring new flows of capital into the hydrocarbon sector, the Law of capitalisation 
stipulated that instead of paying to become majority share holders, investors were obligated 
to invest the sale value of the company they purchased to expand, strengthen, and fortify the 
company’s presence within the Bolivian economy. 
Attempting to further spur investment in the industry, the state rewarded investors for discovering 
reserves in more difficult areas of exploration and extraction by lowering royalty and taxation 
rates from 50 percent to 18 percent on all new reserves. In the Law of Hydrocarbons 1689, the 
government classified all proven reserves as existing and thus subject to a 50 percent taxation 
rate. All probable reserves, either in existing areas of extraction or new areas of extraction, were 
classified as new and thus subject to the 18 percent taxation rate. However, two months after 
the introduction of the Law of Hydrocarbons 1689, the government put forward the Law of 
Hydrocarbons 1731, under which only proven reserves that were already in production at the 
time of the sale of yPfB were classified as existing. 
the changes to the policies surrounding Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector made investment highly 
attractive. In the initial years after the capitalisation, investment more than doubled. In addition, 
Brazil increased the amount of natural gas it originally agreed to import from 8 million cubic 
meters (MMm3) per day to 30 MMm3 per day. In response, from 1997 to 2005, firms invested 
a reported Us$3.435 billion in Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector. the two largest investors were 
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Petrobras and repsol yPf. these investments resulted in an increase in 
proven and probable gas reserves from 5.69 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 
1997 to a peak of 54.86 tcf in 2003. furthermore, proven and probable 
oil reserves increased from 200.9 million barrels (MMbbl) in 1997 to a 
peak of 956.9 MMbbl in 2003.
But while investment and extraction levels increased after the capitalisation, 
the majority of Bolivians failed to see the benefits of such activities. As a 
plan to export Bolivia’s natural gas to the United states via chile surfaced 
in 2003, the large-scale profits transnational energy firms gleaned from 
their activities in Bolivia and long-held historical resentment against 
chile stemming back to 1879 war of the Pacific made Bolivia’s natural 
gas a focal point of social movement struggles. the struggles led to the 
fall of second-term President sanchez de Lozada. vice President carlos 
Mesa ascended to the presidential post and proposed a referendum on 
the country’s hydrocarbon sector in response to the social movement’s 
demands, in which the Bolivian populace voted to nationalise the 
country’s hydrocarbons, re-fund yPfB, and increase tax and royalties rates 
on investing transnational energy firms. Unable to fully implement these 
reforms, Mesa resigned under pressure in June 2005. six months later the 
Bolivian populace elected Evo Morales with the expectation that he would 
fulfil the demands expressed through the referendum. 
EvO MOrALEs AnD AnDEAn cAPItALIsM – 2006 tO PrEsEnt
In 2006, Evo Morales undertook to nationalise the country’s 
hydrocarbon sector. But the changes that proceeded were far 
from traditional perceptions of nationalisation. while the Bolivian 
state increased its power within the hydrocarbon sector, regained 
control of some of its previously capitalised assets, and increased its 
share of revenues coming from the sale and transport of its natural 
gas, the state’s actions resembled more of a free-market buy-out. As a 
representative of yPfB noted, “this is not a nationalisation… this is a 
hostile takeover.”
the nationalisation altered Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector in three primary 
ways. first, the state regained control of Bolivia’s hydrocarbons by 
declaring some of the changes made during the 1990s unconstitutional. 
According to the constitution, the country’s hydrocarbons are the property 
of the state and no concession can transfer this right to another entity. 
As a result, the changes that granted investors ownership rights over 
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Bolivia’s hydrocarbons in the 1990s contradicted pre-existing constitutional law. second, the 
state revitalised yPfB by becoming majority shareholders in its three capitalised companies. the 
state owned minority shares in each of the companies through the capitalisation agreements. 
to increase their shares, the state negotiated with investors to buy back some of the companies. 
while the state sought to enter into joint ventures with investors, a number of them refused and 
sold the state all of their shares. third, the state increased the amount of rent it gained from its 
natural gas by increasing taxes on its sale and regaining control of commercialisation within the 
sector. Prior to the nationalisation, most investors paid an 18 percent royalty rate and minimal 
taxes. After the nationalisation, the 18 percent royalty rate was maintained and 32 percent tax 
was added. gaining control of commercialisation in the sector, the Bolivian state was also able 
to increase the sale price of its natural gas to Brazil and Argentina. 
the Bolivian state increased the rents it accrued from the sale of its natural gas. In addition, 
the dramatic rise in global commodity prices in the years following the nationalisation 
further increased the state’s profits. After the referendum vote in 2004, Mesa introduced the 
first round of changes to the hydrocarbon sector and the government-take increased from 
Us$287 million to Us$608 million. Morales introduced a second round of changes with his 
nationalisation in 2006 and increased the government-take to over Us$1.6 billion by 2008. 
while the falling global commodity prices and minor decreases in demand from Brazil have 
resulted in a decrease in the government-take, the Bolivian state still took in over Us$1 billion 
in rent from its hydrocarbons in 2009. 
for transnational corporations (tncs), the nationalisation resulted in lower returns but did 
little to affect most of their investments. the Bolivian state only sought to regain control of its 
previously capitalised assets. At the time of nationalisation, the firms holding these assets only 
extracted 6.3 percent of Bolivia’s natural gas. the companies extracting the remaining 93.7 
percent did not invest in yPfB during the 1990s. After the nationalisation, these companies 
were forced to sign new contracts that recognised the state as the legal owner of the 
hydrocarbons extracted from Bolivian soil, but their daily operations changed very little. while 
the new tax decreased their profit potential, increasing prices made the decreases to their profit 
margins less significant. In addition, the rents paid after the nationalisation were similar to 
rents most of the investors paid in other parts of the world. As a result, while investors initially 
threatened to bring the Bolivian state to international arbitration, most did not and eventually 
signed on to the new contractual agreements.
the changes made by the Morales government have allowed it to utilise the increased 
profits from its hydrocarbon sector to both stabilise the Bolivian economy and pursue an 
array of redistributive social programs. to protect against external economic shocks and 
increase internal economic stability, the Morales government increased foreign reserves from 
around Us$2 billion to Us$8billion. In addition, it has increased government spending on 
infrastructural improvements, education, and health care. the Morales government has 
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started campaigns to eliminate malnutrition 
and illiteracy, created a program to reward 
families for keeping their children in school, 
developed a system to encourage pre- and 
post-natal doctor visits in order to reduce child 
and maternal mortality rates, and improved 
the public pension system by increasing the 
number of people covered and amount of 
money they receive. through the changes 
made by the Morales government, Bolivia’s 
real gDP growth has risen from 3.4 to 5.2 
percent annually.
while the Morales government has 
successfully increased economic growth and 
achieved some of its redistributive social goals, 
it faces a number of difficulties if it intends to 
continue to use its hydrocarbon sector as its 
primary engine of socioeconomic change. the 
material realities surrounding natural gas as 
a finite resource make continued investment in 
exploration necessary. However, the Morales 
government inherited a hydrocarbon sector 
in which very little investment has occurred 
in exploration activities since the late 1990s. 
while the Morales government has attempted 
to direct more funds towards yPfB and 
exploration activities, pushes to decentralise 
state funding over the past twenty years 
by both Morales supporters and opponents 
have resulted in a distribution of hydrocarbon 
rents that directs profits towards departmental 
and municipal governments. within this 
context, the Morales administration has 
been constrained in its efforts to properly 
fund yPfB and thus made it difficult for the 
state company to appear a viable investment 
partner in potential joint-ventures with foreign 
firms. to continue to use its hydrocarbon 
sector as an engine of economic growth, 
the Bolivian government estimates it needs 
around Us$11 billion in investment over 
the next three years, Us$7 billion of which 
it needs to acquire through outside 
partnerships and investments.
Despite these complications, the market 
demand for Bolivia’s natural gas still exists and 
both old and new investors have agreed to 
help develop the country’s hydrocarbon sector 
in joint-ventures with yPfB. while Brazil has 
stated its intentions to become energy self-
sufficient, it currently imports close to 50 
percent of its natural gas from Bolivia and 
has a take-or-pay contract that guarantees it 
will remain a primary buyer of its neighbour’s 
natural gas until at least 2019. Apart from 
Brazil, Argentina has stepped up its efforts 
in recent years to import greater quantities 
of Bolivia’s natural gas and both Paraguay 
and Uruguay have expressed interest in 
importing natural gas from Bolivia. chile has 
also continually expressed interest in Bolivia’s 
natural gas, but historical difficulties and the 
lack of existing transport infrastructure make 
this highly unlikely. Internal demand for use in 
automobiles and energy production has also 
increased. In addition, new demands have 
come from actors outside of the hydrocarbon 
sector. Mining firms such as Jindal steel have 
sought access to Bolivia’s natural gas to satisfy 
its energy demands at its iron-ore extraction 
site in eastern Bolivia, and Braskem s.A. has 
expressed interest in using Bolivia’s natural 
gas in petrochemical production activities. A 
number of transnational investors including 
gazprom, Petroleos de venezuela s.A., total, 
and repsol yPf have recently made new 
investment commitments in Bolivia that may 
help satisfy these demands. 
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while discussions of regional integration could lead to increased 
investment and market opportunities within Bolivia’s natural gas sector, 
such arrangements have not significantly affected Bolivia’s hydrocarbon 
sector. the Morales government spurned membership in the free trade 
Area of the Americas (ftAA), instead favouring regional integration 
that prioritises social well-being over economic growth through the 
Alianza Boliviariana para los Pueblos de nuestra America (ALBA). But 
very few Latin America countries have joined ALBA and none of the 
current member countries are markets for Bolivia’s natural gas. Bolivia’s 
potential acceptance as a full member into the MErcOsUr common 
Market group could affect its hydrocarbon sector. MErcOsUr 
countries have continually debated the incorporation of Bolivia and 
have seen the country’s natural gas supply as having a role in a south 
American “energy ring”. However, such discussions have diminished 
over the past few years. 
cOncLUsIOn
since Morales has come to power, the Bolivian state has utilised its 
hydrocarbon sector to propel economic growth and to institute 
numerous social reforms. while a dependency upon the profits 
from the sector exists, recent drops in global commodity prices have 
not significantly affected Bolivia’s economy. for private investors, 
increased rents have affected profit margins, but such changes have 
not significantly deterred investment. Bolivia’s neighbours still need 
its natural gas and over the past year both old and new investors 
have agreed to explore and develop new oil and natural gas reserves 
on the Morales government’s terms. In many ways the Morales 
government offers investors something previous governments 
have not: social stability and legitimacy. whereas under previous 
governments transnational firms were often the targets of Bolivia’s 
active social movements, working with yPfB to extract oil and natural 
gas legitimates the actions of transnational firms within the country 
and redirects criticism by social movements targeting the hydrocarbon 
sector towards the state. while a rising number of social movements 
have expressed concern over the environmental impacts of increasing 
oil and natural gas extraction in Bolivia, the Morales government holds 
widespread support throughout much of the country and recently won 
an easy re-election. As a result, the majority of the Bolivian population 
supports the Morales mandate of using the country’s natural resource 
wealth as its engine of growth and socioeconomic change. ■
